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Economic Returns to Higher Education:
Signaling v. Human Capital Theory
An Analysis of Competing Theories
Jim Kjelland
capital.  This inherent human capital, not education 
itself, is what increases productivity and leads to 
higher wages.
 From an individual’s perspective it matters 
very little which theory is most correct.  After all, 
individuals can do little more than optimize their 
private utility within a given system.  Whether 
higher education endows an individual with 
human capital, or acts merely as a signal of existing 
human capital, the fact remains that wages are an 
increasing function of educational attainment.  In 
other words, an individual’s decision to pursue 
higher education depends on nothing more than the 
established positive correlation between education 
and earnings, upon which both signaling theory 
and human capital theory depend.
 From a broader societal perspective, 
in contrast, the efficiency implications of the 
two theories differ considerably.  If higher 
education is acting only as a signal and is not 
contributing independently to an individual’s 
productivity-enhancing human capital, then there 
are several interesting implications; education 
is a very expensive and time consuming signal. 
Additionally, it might not be a very effective 
signal; one must consider the possibility that an 
individual decides not to pursue higher education 
because of financial constraints or for the simple 
fact that they irrationally perceive lower expected 
returns to higher education than comparable 
students.  The implication is that education may 
not screen the most productive individuals, in 
I.  Introduction
 A decision to pursue higher education 
involves an informal analysis on part of the 
individual in educational pursuit of the costs of 
education as measured against the expected value 
of the returns to that education.  Determining the 
expected economic returns of such an investment 
has, largely as a result of its societal relevance, 
been an important and significant topic of research 
for economists.  Chevalier et al (2004), in review 
of several different studies, estimates returns to 
education (as measured by increases in wage and 
salary) at near 10% per additional year of schooling. 
Since the correlation has been established, we may 
be confident that additional education results, on 
average, in elevated wages in the labor market. 
It follows, then, that an individual—with both 
psychic and monetary costs of education in mind 
(Spence 1973)—invests accordingly.
 Two theories exist, which attempt to 
explain the causal relationship between education 
and earnings.  These theories hypothesize about 
the specific mechanism through which education 
affects earnings.  Human capital theory argues 
intuitively that education endows an individual 
with productivity-enhancing human capital, and 
that this increased productivity results in increased 
earnings in the labor market.  Competitive market 
theory does, after all, require that laborers receive 
a wage equal to their marginal product.  Signaling 
theory proffers an oppositional argument, which 
holds that education only reflects inherent human 
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which case it would be beneficial to find a more 
suitable, less costly signal.
 This study, in concert with previous studies, 
attempts to separate out the independent effects 
of the signaling and human capital mechanisms, 
arguing that individuals utilize higher education 
to signal a broad set of inherent productivity-
enhancing characteristics, which are unobserved 
by employers.  I argue that several past studies, 
namely Chevalier (2004), have focused too 
narrowly on measures of inherent intelligence 
as representative of an individual’s signaled 
productivity-enhancing characteristics and that 
estimates of the signaling effect might have been 
downwardly biased as a result.   
II.  Theory and Review of Literature
   The fundamental difficulty in 
distinguishing between signaling and human 
capital theory, as hinted at above, is that both 
models imply a positive correlation between years 
of education and labor market earnings.  Thus, as 
Riley (2001) argues, simply estimating an average 
earnings function is not likely to shed much light 
on the screening role of education.  Economists 
have been forced to utilize round-about, rather 
informal, statistical tests, most of which depend on 
the assumption that some individuals, or groups of 
individuals, are likely to depend more on education 
as a signal/screen than others (Chevalier 2004). 
This assumption is based on the idea that signals/
screens are used in principal-agent relationships 
where asymmetries of information exist and are 
not easily resolved.  More to the point, signals 
are most prevalent for individuals who have 
productivity-enhancing skills or aptitudes that 
are not easily determined by employers.  Under 
such circumstances, education (which is highly 
correlated with productivity measures) signals 
the existence of inherent human capital, thereby 
resolving the information asymmetries.  Resolving 
such information asymmetries reduces turnover 
rates and prevents employers from incurring 
additional recruitment and training costs. 
Employers, as a result, have an incentive to utilize 
signals to identify productive individuals and to 
screen employees accordingly.  
 Because certain groups of individuals are 
presumed to utilize signals in order to resolve 
information asymmetries, whereas others are not, 
economists have been able to run various tests, 
which exploit this distinction and reveal, or at least 
hint at, the effects (or lack thereof) of signaling. 
Some proponents of signaling theory point to 
the lower returns to education of self-employed 
work relative to private sector work as evidence 
of the effects of signaling.  The argument is that 
returns to self-employment can only represent 
returns to human capital; after all, there are no 
information asymmetries when a person employs 
himself and, as a result, there is no need for 
signals.  Any difference, then, between returns 
to education for those self-employed and returns 
for those privately employed must be the result 
of signaling.  Brown and Sessions (1999) found 
higher levels of education and higher returns for 
individuals employed privately as compared to 
self-employed individuals, which supports the 
signaling hypothesis.  Opponents of signaling offer 
a counter-argument and point to a selection bias, 
which Brown and Sessions (1999) do not account 
for.  The assumption made by Brown and Sessions 
(1999) in their study is that individuals know that 
they will be self-employed when they make their 
educational decisions (Chevalier 2004).  If this 
assumption fails, then individuals might possibly 
be educating in expectation of the need to signal 
in the future, because they do not know at the 
time that they will be self-employed.  This might 
explain (independent of signaling theory) the 
lower returns to education for the self employed 
observed by Brown and Sessions (1999).
 In another attempt to prove signaling 
theory, economists point to “sheepskin effects” as 
evidence that education acts as a signal.  Human 
capital theory suggests that the number of years in 
education (and, as is implicit in that education, the 
human capital acquired) is what matters, not the 
degree.  Sheepskin effects refer to the independent 
effect that certificates of qualification appear to 
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have even after controlling for years of education. 
In a study carried out by Hungerford and Solon 
(1987), discontinuities in returns were observed 
for certificated years, suggesting that certificates 
of completion have economic returns independent 
of years of education.  This finding confirms the 
predictions of signaling theory.  It does seem, 
though, that failure to earn a qualification, even 
controlling for years of education, simply reveals 
a lack of ability (learned or not) that could be 
responsible for the lower returns.  In other words, 
individuals that dropped out before receiving 
a qualification might be those individuals who 
overestimated their returns to schooling and quit 
when they discovered their mistake.
 Just as a certificate of completion might 
signal to employers a higher level of ability, 
resulting in higher earnings, the time taken to 
complete a degree also carries with it certain 
ability implications.  Groot and Oosterbeck (1994) 
predict, firstly, “that more rapid completion of a 
degree signals greater ability and should therefore 
lead to higher earnings, and [secondly], that 
years spent in education without obtaining a 
degree should not increase earnings.”  Utilizing 
an extended earnings function, they calculated 
independent returns to effective years (years 
nominally required to attain a certain degree), 
skipped years, repeated years, and inefficient years 
(years completed but not necessary for attainment 
of a degree) of schooling.  They discovered that 
skipped years (a supposed signal of high ability) 
had a significantly negative influence on future 
earnings, a result which runs contrary to signaling 
theory.  Additionally, they found no evidence that 
repeated years (a supposed signal of low ability) 
had any negative effect on earnings, a result which 
also runs contrary to the predictions of signaling 
theory.  Signaling theorists, as we might expect, 
have a counter-argument, which Groot and 
Oosterbeek (1994) acknowledge in their study. 
The counter-argument is that the weak correlation 
between skipped years and IQ (p= .06), suggests 
that employers are right not to accept skipped 
years as a signal for productivity.  In other words, 
they argue that if skipped years is not a good 
measure of productivity (as “proven” by the weak 
correlation), then employers would not accept it as 
a signal, and it should not, therefore, be expected 
to figure into the determination of earnings.  This 
of course assumes that IQ is a good productivity 
measure (which it probably is not) and still fails 
to account for the negative coefficient on the 
“skipped years” variable.
 As illustrated in reviewing the above 
studies, evidence for signaling theory is countered 
with evidence for human capital theory, and 
each side seems to have no problem in justifying 
the other side’s findings in terms of their own 
theory.  Additionally,  the informal statistical tests 
conducted require, at times, dubious assumptions 
(see above discussion of Brown and Sessions 
(1999)), further contributing to the overall 
inconclusiveness of the studies.
 A seemingly more intuitive test, which has 
been conducted by several economists, including 
Chevalier (2004), utilizes ability controls in 
an attempt to isolate the effects of inherent, 
productivity-enhancing aptitudes.  If productivity 
is a result of inherent aptitudes—as hypothesized 
by signaling theory—Chevalier (2004) reasons 
that controlling for ability using aptitude tests 
should reveal lower returns to education.  The 
National Child Development Survey (NCPS) 
kept detailed records on individuals born during 
a particular week in 1958, tracking their early 
development with aptitude tests given at ages 
7, 11, and 16, and later recording earnings data 
as adults.  Controlling for ability using these 
test scores (the earliest test scores being the 
best measure because they exclude the possible 
ability-enhancing effects of education), the study 
reveals that innate ability has a minimal effect on 
returns to education (10.7% returns as compared 
to 10% returns for women when controlling for 
ability, with similar results for men).  Chevalier 
(2004) concludes from this that education creates 
ability or human capital, which then determines 
wages, and that the signaling effect of education 
is minimal.
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 Chevalier (2004) makes a very critical 
and limiting assumption in his study, which 
is that ability, as measured by an aptitude 
test, encapsulates the inherent productivity-
enhancing traits of an individual.  I argue that the 
administered aptitude tests reveal little more than 
a limited measure of inherent intelligence, and we 
should not be surprised, therefore, to find a weak 
correlation between these tests scores and earnings. 
Inherent intelligence is only one of the many 
inherent productivity-enhancing traits signaled 
by educational achievement.  When attempting to 
determine the effects of signaling, therefore, one 
must control for a more representative measure 
of an individual’s inherent productivity.  This 
raises an important question:  Which measure of 
productivity does an individual signal with his or 
her education?  Certainly, intelligence figures into 
the signal, but, as discussed above, intelligence 
alone is worth very little.  Another important 
determinant of educational success and, as follows, 
labor market productivity, is work ethic, or effort, 
or some other motivational measure.  I argue 
that these two measures, in aggregate, determine 
an individual’s productivity, are signaled by 
educational achievement, and result in higher 
earnings in the labor market.  Controlling for 
both inherent intelligence and motivation should, 
therefore, result in lower returns to education.
 The problem, of course, is that most 
measures of motivation or effort are inextricably 
linked with educational achievement.  Consider 
that GPA is a measure of effort, intelligence, and 
the skills and knowledge gained through education. 
A positive correlation between GPA and wages 
(productivity), therefore, tells us nothing about the 
mechanism behind the increase in wages; we are 
unable to determine whether the higher earnings 
are a result of acquired human capital or inherent 
intelligence and work ethic, and, as a consequence, 
we are unable to distinguish between signaling 
and human capital theory.
 Chevalier (2004) encountered this 
complication in a second round of ability-control 
tests, which he conducted.  He used data from 
the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), 
which records earnings and ability as measured 
at the time of a given job interview.  Chevalier 
(2004) observed, in contrast to previous tests, a 
significant decrease in returns to education when 
using IALS ability-controls (10.6% returns as 
compared to 7.7% returns with ability controls). 
There are two explanations for this decrease. 
The first is a human capital explanation, which 
Chevalier (2004) assumes when he states, “As we 
might expect, using ability controls taken at later 
ages confounds the effects of education on ability 
scores.”  In other words, he argues that ability tests 
taken at later ages are more strongly correlated 
with wages (productivity) because of the human 
capital acquired during education; this acquired 
human capital results in higher test scores and 
higher productivity in the labor market.
 An alternative explanation, and one 
which I will attempt to confirm in this study, is 
consistent with signaling theory.  The signaling 
explanation, in paralleling Chevalier’s argument, 
goes as follows:  As we might expect, using ability 
controls taken at later ages confounds the effects 
of work-ethic/motivation on ability scores.  In 
other words, the argument is that ability scores 
taken at later ages are more strongly correlated 
with wages (productivity), because the ability 
scores reflect the acquisition of human capital, 
which in turn reflects the work ethic and inherent 
intelligence of individuals.  But, and this is critical, 
it is the natural intelligence and work ethic of the 
individual, not the resulting human capital, which 
leads to greater productivity and higher earnings 
in the labor market.  And it is this intelligence and 
work ethic, which an individual signals through 
educational achievement.
 To confirm either of these two arguments, 
we must first find a way to separate the effects of 
inherent effort and intelligence from the human-
capital enhancing effects of education.  In other 
words, we must find measures of intelligence 
and effort/motivation which are not confounded 
with the effects of education.  Controlling for 
intelligence and effort/motivation using these 
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measures should, I hypothesize, result in a more 
accurate estimation of the signaling effect.
III.  Data and Empirical Model
 While the NCDS provides an excellent 
measure with which to control for inherent 
intelligence (aptitude tests taken at age 7), the 
dataset does not provide a measure for effort/
motivation that is not confounded by the effects of 
education.  The National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), in contrast, provides a proximate 
measure for motivation that is independent of 
educational achievement but does not offer as 
reliable a measure with which to control for inherent 
intelligence; the choice is between Armed Forces 
Qualification Tests (AFQT) taken by individuals 
between the ages of 14 and 21, and IQ tests taken 
at similar ages by a relatively small proportion of 
the total sample population (937 of 12,634). Still, 
because this study requires a measure for both 
inherent intelligence and motivation, I utilize the 
NLSY as a data-source.
 The NLSY proxy for motivation derives 
from the Rotter Scale, which asks participants to 
choose the statement from the following pair of 
statements which best represents the beliefs they 
hold:
1.  What happens to me is my own doing.  
2.  Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough 
control over the direction my life is taking.
 This pair of statements relates to ideas of 
internal and external loci of control.  Individuals 
with external locus of control—as represented by 
statement 2—believe that outside factors (not their 
own actions) determine the outcome of a given 
situation (Ingrum 2006).  In turn, individuals 
with internal locus of control—as represented by 
statement 1—believe that their own actions (not 
outside factors) determine the outcome of a given 
situation.  
 The idea in using a locus of control 
variable as a motivational measure depends upon 
the presumption that individuals with internal 
locus of control—who believe that their actions 
affect their circumstances—are more likely to be 
highly motivated and to put forth greater effort in 
all endeavors, including employment.  I created 
a dummy variable to reflect an individual’s locus 
of control, setting statement two (representing 
external locus of control) equal to 0 and setting 
statement one (representing internal locus of 
control) equal to 1.  This dummy variable acts as 
my control for motivation.
 In addition to this motivational control and 
in accordance with Chevalier (2004), I utilize an 
inherent ability control.  As mentioned above, there 
are two NLSY ability measures:  AFQT aptitude 
tests and an IQ test.  The fundamental limitation 
of using such variables is that both tests were 
administered to individuals between the ages of 
14 and 21; the implication is that such individuals 
would have already undergone significant 
schooling by the time they took either test, thereby 
confounding the ability measure with educational 
attainment.  Consequently, it becomes difficult, 
if not impossible, to identify the independent 
effect of inherent intelligence on earnings.  This is 
especially relevant for AFQT, which tests specific 
verbal and quantitative skills likely to be learned in 
school.  Intelligence Quotient tests, being a more 
general measure of ability, might more accurately 
reflect inherent intelligence, but, again, the limited 
sample population for the administered IQ tests 
poses a serious complication in its own right. 
As a result, I utilize AFQT scores for my ability 
control.
 In my empirical model, I apply this ability 
control (AFQT) and the dummy motivational 
control (LOCUS) to an extended earnings function 
in a series of four models as outlined in Table 1. 
Model 1 acts as a base earnings function without 
controls added; dummy variables for different 
levels of educational attainment are utilized as 
independent variables.  Model 2 assesses the 
independent effect of including my control for 
ability.  Model 3 does the same with my control 
for motivation.  Finally, Model 4 applies both 
controls together to the base earnings function.  
 The wage data utilized for the dependent 
variable derives from the NLSY measure of total 
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income from wages and salary.  Income data was 
recorded each year for the period 1979-2004, and 
I utilize the 2004 wage variable (WAGE2004) 
as a representative measure.  Concerning the 
independent variables for educational attainment, 
the NLSY provides a variable that records the 
highest grade completed by each individual as of 
the 2004 survey.  In order to isolate the returns 
to different levels of educational attainment, I 
created a series of dummy variables: one for high 
school graduates (12 years of education), a second 
for individuals having undergone some amount 
of college (13-15 years of education), and a final 
variable for college graduates (16 or more years 
of education).  These measures are represented 
in the earnings function by the independent 
variables HIGHSCHOOL, SOMECOLLEGE, and 
COLLEGEGRAD.  My primary focus will be on 
returns to higher education and, more specifically, 
on returns to a degree in higher education; the 
coefficient on the COLLEGEGRAD variable will, 
therefore, be of greatest concern to this study.  By 
observing how this coefficient changes with the 
inclusion of control variables for inherent ability 
and motivation, we should be able to identify the 
effects of education as a signal.  If the signaling 
effect is large, we should expect a significant drop 
in the COLLEGEGRAD coefficient when the 
controls are added to the base earnings function.
IV.  Results 
 In calculating the base earnings 
function outlined in Model 1, estimated returns 
to HIGHSCHOOL, SOMECOLLEGE, and 
COLLEGEGRAD were $10,647, $17,981, and 
$44,935 respectively.  In 
Model 2, when controlling 
for inherent ability with 
AFQT, the coefficient on 
COLLEGEGRAD fell to 
$24,630—a decrease in 
returns of 45.2%.  This 
would, at first, appear to 
be evidence of a large 
signaling effect.  In contrast, 
the application of the 
motivational control in Model 3 resulted in a 
miniscule decrease of the COLLEGEGRAD 
coefficient, suggesting that the motivational 
signaling effect is near nonexistent.  The results 
of the regressions are outlined in Table 2.
 The 45.2% decrease in the 
COLLEGEGRAD coefficient observed in 
Model 2 is similar to the 27.4% decrease in 
returns found by Chevalier (2004) in his second 
round of ability-control tests.  As you may 
remember, Chevalier attributed this decrease in 
returns to the confounding effects of education 
on ability scores for ability tests taken at later 
ages.  However, signaling theory has its own 
explanation for this decrease in returns, which 
is that ability tests taken at later ages confound 
the effects of work-ethic/motivation on ability 
scores.  These very same justifications can be 
used to explain the 45% decrease in returns 
observed in my study; controlling for ability 
using AFQT does not, therefore, allow us to 
conclude anything significant about the signaling 
effects of education.
 In order to confirm the confounding 
effects of education on AFQT ability scores, I 
ran an additional regression with ability controls.  
Once again, I utilized AFQT as a control 
variable, but limited the testing population to 
those individuals who took the test between 
the ages of 14 and 17 (PRECOLLEGEAFQT).  
One would expect to find a smaller decrease 
in returns to higher education using this 
control (as opposed to AFQT), because the 
PRECOLLEGEAFQT scores are confounded 
75
Table 1: Four Models
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with fewer years of education.  This does occur 
with the coefficient on COLLEGEGRAD 
falling to $28,465, as opposed to $24,630 when 
controlling with AFQT.  This result is promising 
if we assume that an individual’s work ethic or 
level of motivation is established before entering 
higher education.  If this assumption holds, 
then any additional decrease in the coefficient 
on COLLEGEGRAD—when controlling with 
AFQT as opposed to PRECOLLEGEAFQT—
should reflect the returns to human capital 
acquired during higher education.
 In addition to the problem of AFQT being 
confounded with educational attainment, AFQT 
might also—as signaling theorists argue—be 
confounded with motivation.  If AFQT does 
partly reflect an individual’s motivation, then a 
second complication arises; after all, I already 
have an independent variable (LOCUS) with 
which to control for motivation.  If AFQT scores 
reflect a combination of ability and motivation, 
then adding this additional motivational variable 
will result in collinearity problems and will 
destabilize the coefficients on all independent 
variables.  This complication could possibly 
explain the statistically insignificant result 
(t=1.772) that I found for the coefficient on 
LOCUS when adding it as a control variable 
in addition to AFQT.  Even if the result had 
been statistically significant, the coefficient on 
COLLEGEGRAD actually increased by $74, 
which is insignificant in of itself.  Removing 
AFQT from the regression, the coefficient on 
LOCUS becomes significant (t=4.665) but 
still lacks in magnitude with the coefficient 
on COLLEGEGRAD falling to $44,224—a 
decrease of only $712.  Disregarding collinearity 
problems, this result suggests that motivation 
has little effect on an individual’s returns to 
education, a result that runs contrary to signaling 
theory.
V.  Conclusion
 Ultimately, this study reveals a strong, 
positive and significant correlation between 
AFQT scores and earnings in the labor market.  
Additionally, my regression analysis fails to 
establish a significant correlation between 
the motivational measure, LOCUS, and 
labor market earnings.  If AFQT scores were 
accurate measures of inherent intelligence and, 
additionally, if our locus of control variable 
accurately measured work ethic, then I could be 
confident in concluding that individuals utilize 
higher education as a signal of their inherent 
intelligence, but not of their work ethic, and that 
the signaling effect of education is substantial.  
But AFQT is not a good measure of inherent 
intelligence.  Instead, it likely measures a 
combination of intelligence, motivation, and 
educational background.  Because AFQT likely 
reflects motivational factors, controlling for 
an additional motivational measure—as I did 
in including the variable LOCUS—may have 
resulted in issues of multicollinearity, which, in 
turn, may have destabilized the coefficients on 
all independent variables in the regression.  This 
might account for the insignificant effect of the 
Table 2: Results
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variable LOCUS on returns to higher education, 
though such a conclusion is only conjecture.
 The results of this study are inconclusive, 
but I believe that the theoretical foundation of 
this paper is sound.  If I had been able to find 
an objective measure of inherent intelligence, I 
believe regression analysis would have revealed 
a more pronounced signaling effect for both 
inherent intelligence as well as motivational 
measures.  Locating a dataset with suitable 
variables must be the first step taken by 
researchers who wish to pursue a regression 
analysis to identify the signaling effect of 
education.  Chevalier (2004) located an excellent 
measure for inherent intelligence but failed 
to control for other important productivity-
enhancing characteristics, such as the 
motivational measures from the NLSY explored 
in this study.  Finding a single dataset containing 
both ability and motivational variables is 
necessary for the success of regression tests like 
those conducted by Chevalier and myself.  If 
such data is unavailable, one would be better 
served in turning to alternative methods of 
testing signaling and human capital theory. 
REFERENCES
Bennett, Bruce T.  “The Demand for Higher 
Education:  A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the 
Human Capital Theory.” Illinois Wesleyan 
University, 1993.
Blundell, R., Dearden, L. and Sianesi, B. 
“Evaluating the Impact of Education on 
Earnings in the UK:  Models, Methods and 
Results from the NCDSA.”  Institute  f o r 
Fiscal Studies, Working Paper 03/20, 2003.  
Brown, S. and Sessions, J. “Education and 
Employment Status:  A Test of the Screening 
Hypothesis for Italy.”  Economics of 
Education Review, 1999, 18, pp. 397-404.
Buchinsky, M.  “Changes in the US Wage 
Structure 1963-1987:  Application of 
Quantile Regression.”  Economica, 1994, 
62, pp. 405-458.
Castagnetti, C., Chelli, F. and Rosti, L. 
“Educational Performance as Signalling 
Device: Evidence from Italy.” Economics 
Bulletin, 2005, 9(4), pp.1-7.
Chevalier, A., Harmon, C., Walker, I. Zhu, 
Y.  “Does Education Raise Productivity, or 
Just Reflect it?” Economic Journal, Royal 
Economic Society, 2004, 114(499), pp. 499-
517.
Groot, W. Oosterbeek, H.  “Earnings Effects of 
Different Components of Human Capital 
vs. Screening.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics,1994, 76, pp. 317-321.
Hungerford, T. Solon, G.  “Sheepskin Effects 
in the Returns to Education.”  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 1987, 69, pp. 175-
177.
Ingrum, Adrienne.  “High School Dropout 
Determinants:  The Effect of Socioeconomic 
Status and Learning Disabilities.” Illinois 
Wesleyan University, 2006.
Riley, J. G.  “Testing the Educational Screening 
Hypothesis.”  Journal of Political Economy, 
1979, 87, pp. 227-252.
Spence, M.  “Job Market Signalling.”  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1973, 87, pp. 355-
374.
Weiss, A.  “Human Capital vs. Signalling 
Explanations of Wages.”  The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(4), pp. 133-
154.
